

# The Game of Revolutionaries and Spies 

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- All graphs in this talk will be simple and undirected.
- For a vertex $v \in V(G)$, let $N(v)$ denote its neighborhood.
- $K_{n}$ is the complete graph on $n$ vertices, $C_{n}$ the cycle on $n$ vertices, and $K_{n, m}$ is the complete bipartite graph having partite sets size $n$ and $m$.

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- Check: is there some vertex having at least $m$ revolutionaries and no spies? If so, revolutionaries win.


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## Example

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G=K_{3,3}, r=4, s=1, m=2 .
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## Fact

If $s<\left\lfloor\frac{r}{m}\right\rfloor \leq|V(G)|$ then spies lose in Round 0 .

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## Fact

If $s \geq r-m+1$ then spies will never lose.

## Bias

## Jane Butterfield

## Bias

I don't really support the revolutionaries.

## Bias

I don't really support the revolutionaries.


## Bias

I usually root for the spies

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For a given $G, r, s, m$ we say that

- spies win if there exists a strategy for Player 2 by which she can prevent Player 1 from ever winning.
- spies lose if there exists a strategy for Player 1 by which he will win after a finite number of rounds.


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Introduced by Jozef Beck
Theorem (Howard and Smyth (2011+))

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## Theorem (Howard and Smyth (2011+))

- When $G$ is a tree with more than $s$ vertices, spies lose if and only if $s \leq \frac{r}{m}-1$.
- When $G$ is the infinite grid and $m=2$, spies lose if $s \leq \frac{3}{4}(r-1)$, but spies win if $s \geq r-2$.


## Question

How many spies are needed to win? We already know $s \geq\left\lfloor\frac{r}{m}\right\rfloor$ spies are necessary, and $r-m+1$ spies suffice.

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- Call a graph $G$ "good for revolutionaries" if spies lose the game played on $G$ with parameters $r, s, m$ unless $\frac{s}{r} \approx 1$.


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What graphs are good for spies or good for revolutionaries?

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& \text { Theorem }(\mathrm{B}-\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{W}-\mathrm{Z}(2011+)) \\
& \text { If } s<\frac{7}{10} r-\frac{3}{5} \text { and } 2 \mid r \text {, then spies lose. }
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## Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

If $s<\frac{7}{10} r-\frac{3}{5}$ and $2 \mid r$, then spies lose. If $s \geq \frac{7}{10} r$ then spies win.

## Sketch of proof

Call the partite sets $V_{1}$ and $V_{2}$.

- After Player 1 moves in Round $j$ there are $r_{i}$ revolutionaries in $V_{i}$.


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- After Player 2 moves in Round $j$ there are $s_{i}$ spies in $V_{i}$.
- Some spies may be "lonely"
- Suppose at the end of Round $j$ there are $\ell_{i}$ lonely spies in $V_{i}$.
- Unless $s_{i} \geq\left\lfloor\frac{r-s_{3-i}+\ell_{3-i}}{2}\right\rfloor$ for $i \in[2]$, the revolutionaries can win in Round $j+1$.

Revolutionary strategy:

- Revolutionaries all begin in $V_{1}$. Then there must be at least $r / 2$ spies in $V_{1}$, or spies will lose in Round 1.

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- Now $\ell_{1} \geq r / 2-s_{2}$; say $\ell_{1}=r / 2-s_{2}$ (to simplify proof).
- To avoid losing in Round 2, spies need

$$
s_{1} \geq\left\lfloor\frac{r-s_{2}}{2}\right\rfloor \text { and } s_{2} \geq\left\lfloor\frac{r-s_{1}+\ell_{1}}{2}\right\rfloor .
$$

Which together imply that $5 s \geq \frac{7}{2} r-3$, and so $s \geq \frac{7}{10} r-3 / 5$.

## Complete bipartite graphs, cont.

> Theorem $(\mathrm{B}-\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{W}-\mathrm{Z}(2011+))$
> For $s, r \in \mathbb{N}$ and $G=K_{n, n}$, where $n \gg s+r$ :

## Complete bipartite graphs, cont.

Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))
For $s, r \in \mathbb{N}$ and $G=K_{n, n}$, where $n \gg s+r$ :

- If $m=3$ then when $s \geq \frac{r}{3}+\frac{r}{6}$, spies win.


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- If $m \geq 4$ then when $s=1.708 \frac{r}{m}$, spies win.


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- We conjecture that $s \geq \frac{3}{2} \frac{r}{m}$ spies suffice.


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- We conjecture that $s \geq \frac{3}{2} \frac{r}{m}$ spies suffice.
- If $r \geq s\left(\frac{m}{2}+\frac{\lceil m / 3\rceil}{2}\right)+2 m$, spies lose.


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What graph properties determine when a graph will be good for spies or good for revolutionaries?

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If $G$ has a dominating vertex then when $s>\frac{r}{m}-1$, spies win.

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## Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

If $G$ has a dominating vertex then when $s>\frac{r}{m}-1$, spies win.
Player 2 will keep any "off-duty" spy (one who isn't currently covering a meeting) on the dominating vertex. Can show that she then has enough off-duty spies at any time to cover any future meetings.

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## Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

If $G$ has a dominating vertex then when $s>\frac{r}{m}-1$, spies win.

## Corollary (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

Fix $n>r$. Then for every $0 \leq m \leq\binom{ n}{2}$, there exists a graph $G(i)$ having $n$ vertices and $i$ edges such that if $s \geq \frac{r}{m}-1$ then spies win the game played on $G(i)$.

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## Graph parameters, cont.

A graph is unicyclic if it contains at most one cycle.

## Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

If $G$ is a cycle and $s \geq r / m$, then spies win.
If $G$ is a cycle of length $\ell$ and $r / m>s>r / m-1 \geq 0$, then spies lose if and only if $\ell>s+2$.

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## Theorem (B-C-P-W-Z (2011+))

If $G$ is a unicyclic graph and $s \geq r / m$, then spies win.
Suppose $G$ contains exactly one cycle, $C_{\ell}$, and $|V(G)|-\ell=t$. If $s+1>r / m>s \geq 1$ then spies lose if and only if
$\ell \geq \max \{s-t+3,4\}$.

## Future work

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- Graphs are good for spies when there is a "good" place to put "off-duty" spies (e.g. dominating vertex). Is there a less restrictive spanning tree condition?
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- Graphs are good for spies when there is a "good" place to put "off-duty" spies (e.g. dominating vertex). Is there a less restrictive spanning tree condition?
- We have started to consider $K_{n, n, n}$. We know that as $k \rightarrow \infty$ the complete $k$-partite graph with parts of size $n$ (for $n>s, r$ ) becomes good for spies (i.e. $s=\frac{r}{m}$ spies suffice to win.)


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